Editor’s comment: While most medical providers in this state are upset over the reduction of their fees for patient care, like the theory of “one bad apple spoiling the bunch”, many suffer due to the sins of others. However, between cases of excessive treatment and attempts to circumvent or manipulate the Fee Schedule, we believe providers will continue to see bills reduced until they begin to police themselves.
In Martis v. Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Company, No. 3-08-0004 Illinois Appellate Court Third District (March 27, 2009), Plaintiff—a chiropractor—filed a class action complaint against Defendant, Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Company, alleging conspiracy, unjust enrichment, violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act and breach of contract. The trial court dismissed all but Defendant’s breach of contract claim. The trial court then granted Plaintiff’s motion to certify a class. On appeal, Defendant argued
(1) Plaintiff does not have a valid breach of contract claim, and
(2) The trial court abused its discretion by certifying a class.
The Appellate Court Third District held Plaintiff cannot state a claim for breach of contract against defendant and thus, reversed and remanded.
Plaintiff chiropractor began treating an employee of Water Management Corp. of Illinois who was injured while working. Water Management had a workers’ compensation insurance policy from Defendant Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Company. That policy listed Water Management Corp. of Illinois, employer, as the insured. The policy stated: “We [Grinnell] will pay promptly when due the benefits required by you [employer] by the workers compensation law.” Another provision of the policy stated: “We [Grinnell] are directly and primarily liable to any person entitled to benefits payable by this insurance. Those persons may enforce our duties; so may an agency authorized by law. Enforcement may be against us or against you [employer] and us.”
After Plaintiff provided medical treatment to the Water Management employee, Plaintiff submitted bills to Defendant for payment. Plaintiff’s bills were reviewed by a third-party medical invoice review firm, which applied PPO discounts to Plaintiff’s bills even though Plaintiff did not have a PPO agreement with Defendant. Defendant paid Plaintiff the discounted amounts.
In response, Plaintiff filed a seven-count complaint against Defendant, seeking to represent a class of Illinois health care providers who submitted bills to Defendant under workers’ compensation insurance and had bills reduced because of a PPO discount even though the providers did not have a PPO contract with Defendant. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint.
The trial court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. The court then ruled on Plaintiff’s motion to certify a class action. The trial court concluded Plaintiff, as a class representative, could not prevail on his consumer fraud count, but could potentially prevail on his breach of contract claim, as a third-party beneficiary of the workers’ compensation policy. As to count IV, the court certified the following class: “All licensed Illinois healthcare providers who: (a) submitted claims for medical expenses pursuant to a Grinnell workers’ compensation policy; (b) received or were tendered payment between October 20, 1996 and October 20, 2006 in which Grinnell took a PPO discount; and (c) did not have a PPO contract with Grinnell.” Defendant filed a petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(8) (210 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(8) (2006)), which was granted.
The Court noted the need to first show an actual cause of action before any class could be certified. The Court further noted Plaintiff was not a party to the contract which would be a prerequisite for maintaining a breach of contract claim. Here, the provision relied upon by Plaintiff, which makes Defendant liable to “any person entitled to benefits payable by this insurance” did not identify any third parties and Plaintiff was not a “person entitled to benefits” pursuant to the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act. See 820 ILCS 305/4(g) (West 2004) (only “the employee, his or her personal representative or beneficiary” are entitled to benefits under a workers’ compensation policy and have standing to sue an insurer to enforce such a policy). Plaintiff failed to identify any provision in the policy which referenced him or “medical providers,” the class to which he belongs. He did not sustain his burden of proving he was a third party beneficiary of the workers’ compensation policy and because he was not a third party beneficiary of the workers’ compensation policy, he had no right to enforce it. Thus, Plaintiff’s breach of contract action was dismissed. Since Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim is the only cause of action upon which his class action was allowed, Plaintiff’s class action against Defendant was also dismissed.
Plaintiff asked for the other dismissed counts to be reconsidered, but the Court noted he had not filed a cross-appeal and therefore was not allowed to challenge those decisions. The Court nevertheless noted they would also have found the other counts were properly dismissed due to the failure to state a cause of action because he could not meet the standard of unjust enrichment or show Defendant owed him any duty.
This case is also an example of the increasing trend of medical providers moving into the courts in what appear to be attempts to circumvent the workers’ compensation system by either refusing to abide by the Medical Fee Schedule, refusing to bill within reasonable guidelines or in many cases, refusing to participate in the IWCC process to attempt to justify their charges.
Your author spoke to two different Petitioner attorneys who noted they didn’t mind the providers suing the insurance companies because it was a welcome change from their point of view of the refusal of some medical providers to attend a hearing to justify their charges and instead attempting to pursue injured workers for unpaid balances in clear violation of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act. One attorney suggested a similar provider had already indicated he would spend more in legal fees in other venues trying to find an alternative method to collect his balances rather than appear before an Arbitrator who would discount the charges on almost every occasion. This article was researched and written by Shawn R. Biery, J.D. If you have thoughts and comments or need the case citation, please send a reply to sbiery@keefe-law.com.