Liberal ruling for police officer on normal patrol when injured entitled to a line-of-duty disability pension.
Editor’s Comments: Police officer injured in a car accident when responding to complaints of speeding was entitled to a line-of-duty disability pension. The court ruled the patrol officer was exposed to a “special risk” not encountered by ordinary citizens and thus was performing an “act of duty” when injured. We assure all of you this expansion of the Pension Code will cost Illinois taxpayers money. With deference to the court, we don’t see anything in this decision which indicates this was anything other than a random fender-bender to which we are all exposed. We ask all of you would it be a qualifying event if he were driving to a donut shop to get donuts?
In Jones v. Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund of the City of Bloomington, (Nos. 6MR 243 and 06 MR 276 September 15, 2008), the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court and held Plaintiff was entitled to a line-of-duty disability pension for injuries sustained while on normal police patrol. In interpreting the statute the Court found Jones was exposed to a “special risk” not ordinarily encountered by civilians in the ordinary walks of life, and therefore, was performing an “act of duty” when injured entitling him to a line-of-duty pension.
On June 13, 2005 Plaintiff, a 12-year veteran of the police force, was on patrol duty when he was involved in a motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff was driving normally on his way to investigate complaints of speeding. As he was driving toward the airport, a car shot out in front of his vehicle and hit the side of the police van. Plaintiff suffered injuries to his shoulder and back and later underwent back surgery. He filed an application for line-of-duty disability benefits. He alleged he could no longer perform full duties as a police officer due to his injuries.
The Pension Board held a hearing on the application and concluded Plaintiff was not entitled to a line-of-duty pension, but granted him a non-duty disability pension. The Board found Jones physically disabled for service so as to render him eligible for retirement and awarded him a non-duty disability pension totaling 50% of his salary as opposed to 65% he would have received for a line-of-duty disability pension. The Board relied upon White v. City of Aurora to conclude the driving a police van did not involve a “special risk” as required by the definition of “act of duty.” In White a divided panel of the Appellate Court held an officer who was on patrol when he slipped while exiting his vehicle to place a parking ticket on an illegally parked car was not entitled to a line-of-duty disability pension. The police department also employed civilians to issue parking citations. Therefore, the White court concluded the officer was not exposed to a “special risk” not ordinarily encountered by civilians in the ordinary walks of life. On administrative review, the circuit court reversed the Board’s decision.
On appeal, two issues were presented to the Court:
1. Whether the correct standard of review was a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard or one of de novo review.
2. Whether Plaintiff, as a patrol officer, was exposed to a “special risk” so as to constitute an “act of duty,” which would make him eligible for a line-of-duty pension.
The parties disputed the correct standard of review. The Board alleged a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard was proper because it was required to weigh facts in reaching its conclusion. Plaintiff argued de novo review was proper as relevant facts were undisputed and the appeal hinged on the definition of “act of duty,” which required statutory interpretation. The Court agreed with neither party and instead found before it a mixed question of law and fact. Thus the Court concluded the correct standard of review was a clearly erroneous standard. Applying this standard of review, the Court found the Board’s decision to deny Jones a line-of-duty disability pension was clearly erroneous and affirmed the trial court’s reversal of the Board’s decision.
On appeal, the Court discussed the requirements of the Pension Code. In doing so it found something more than being “on duty” is required for a line-of-duty pension. The statute defines “act of duty” as “any act of police duty inherently involving special risk, not ordinarily assumed by a citizen in the ordinary walks of life…” The court noted not all police activities involve “special risk.” For example, the Court discussed a case in which an officer who was injured in a fall from a chair while taking a police report was not entitled to a line-of-duty disability pension because the act of taking a police report did not involve a “special risk.”
The Court went on to discuss whether Jones faced a “special risk” while on patrol duty and concluded he did. In reaching this conclusion the Court expressly rejected the reasoning and holding in White cited by the Board. Instead it relied on Alm v. Lincolnshire Police Pension Board, where the court held an officer who was injured while riding his bike on patrol was entitled to a line-of-duty disability pension. The Alm court looked to the capacity in which the officer was riding his bike finding a “special risk” not encountered by ordinary citizens. The Court followed this reasoning holding the proper focus is on the capacity in which the officer was acting at the time of the injury.
As Plaintiff was responding to a complaint of speeding at the airport and had to be prepared for any eventuality not faced by ordinary citizens in all walks of life, the Court, interpreting the statute liberally in favor of Plaintiff, concluded he was exposed to a “special risk” and thus performing an “act of duty” when he was injured. Therefore, he was entitled to a line-of-duty pension under the statute.
If you have thoughts or comments on line-of-duty versus non-line-of-duty disability benefits, please send a reply.
