Federal appeals court knocks out wacky work claim for nondisabling exposure to noxious gas.
Editor’s comment: The Seventh Circuit Appellate Court certainly can write lengthy, detailed, thorough, comprehensive, exhaustive and exhausting opinions. In Lewis v. Citgo Petroleum, (No. 80-1483, decided April 6, 2009), two Plaintiffs were working at the Citgo Petroleum plant in Lemont, IL. They were allegedly exposed to hydrogen sulfide gas. They lost no time from work. They received no medical care until several years later.
It is hard to imagine but their personal injury claim has now ended seven years later! The claim started in state court then moved to federal court. The experts’ testimony became the focus of the dispute where the doctors felt one Plaintiff suffered from occupational asthma and the other doctor felt a Plaintiff suffered from headaches.
In an extraordinary review of the Daubert test on consideration of expert testimony, the Seventh Circuit ruled the experts could not causally connect the conditions to the claimed exposure and upheld dismissal on summary judgment.
The Court also ruled, under Illinois law, a refinery worker’s mild anxiety, caused by alleged exposure to hydrogen sulfide in a work incident at a refinery, was not so severe as to allow recovery from the refinery on a negligent infliction of emotional distress theory. The worker’s mild anxiety, for which she had not sought treatment, caused her to recheck her work, but only minimally interfered with her everyday life.
It is our hope the Illinois judiciary and the Workers’ Compensation Commission will take a similar view of the evidentiary standards necessary to find causal connection in disputed claims. Our favorite cite from this ruling is:
As we have said: “[Q]ualifications alone do not suffice. A supremely qualified expert cannot waltz into the courtroom and render opinions unless those opinions are based upon some recognized scientific method and are reliable and relevant under the test set forth by the Supreme Court in Daubert.” Clark v. Takata Corp., 192 F.3d 750, 759 n.5 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Rosen, 78 F.3d at 318 (“[A] district judge asked to admit scientific evidence must determine whether the evidence is genuinely scientific, as distinct from being unscientific speculation offered by a genuine scientist.”). Instead, to be admissible, a medical expert’s ultimate opinion must be grounded in the scientific process and may not be merely a subjective belief or unsupported conjecture. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-90; Goodwin v. MTD Prods., Inc., 232 F.3d 600, 608-09 (7th Cir. 2000).
The link to the case is http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/MM0JPVPO.pdf <http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/MM0JPVPO.pdf
