Windshield wiper fluid movement wipes out jobs and claim for double punitive damages in employment practices claims.
Editor’s comment: Plaintiffs were assistant store managers for Defendant Station Operators, Inc. and alleged discrimination on the basis of age, race, national origin, and religion in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 1981, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) after being terminated. They sought punitive damages under both Title VII and Section 1981 by alleging each claim raised separate factual issues.
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois was not persuaded. It indicated both claims arose from the same series of operative facts and to permit Plaintiffs to seek punitive damages under both provisions would potentially enable the double recovery Section 1981a(a)(1) seeks to avoid. In Thakkar v. Station Operators, Inc. (2010 WL 832129 N.D.Ill.) Plaintiffs were married employees who were assistant managers at two gas stations owned by the Defendant. Plaintiffs are of Indian descent, are Hindu, identify their race as East Asian, and were born in 1951. They were both terminated shortly after they transferred five cases of windshield fluid between their gas stations by driving the product themselves. This was clearly against company rules, but there was evidence these rules were not strictly enforced.
Shortly before the Plaintiffs were terminated one Plaintiff filed two separate complaints with Station Operators, Inc.’s (SOI’s) management about his store manager not following SOI’s security procedures. The store manager was a 31 year old Caucasian female of Irish descent. Her direct supervisor discussed the security issues raised by Plaintiff with the manager and placed a letter of reprimand in her employment file. Plaintiffs’ transfer of product between the gas stations that led to them being terminated occurred three days after Plaintiff lodged his second complaint. SOI terminated Plaintiffs less than a month later for insubordination and violation of company policies and safety procedures.
Plaintiffs filed suit asserting Defendants SOI and their manager violated Title VII, Section 1981, and the ADEA by terminating Plaintiffs for discriminatory reasons. They claimed unlawful discharge and disparate enforcement of company rules. To demonstrate discrimination under the burden-shifting method chosen by Plaintiffs they must offer evidence showing:
1) They belong to a protected class;
2) They were meeting their employer’s legitimate job expectations;
3) They suffered an adverse employment action; and
4) Similarly situated employees outside of the protected class were treated more favorably by the employer.
If an employee/plaintiff demonstrates these elements an employer/defendant should offer evidence to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision. The employer must have a reasonable explanation for the action it took. SOI argued Plaintiffs’ violation of company rules regarding driving and transferring product was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination. Plaintiffs countered the rule was deployed against them in a discriminatory manner because the rule was not consistently enforced. They presented evidence a Caucasian employee who engaged in a similar driving/product transfer violation was not terminated.
The Court found Plaintiffs demonstrated the necessary elements because they were members of a protected class, they had a good record of performance, they were terminated, and the selective nature with which the driving rules were apparently applied combined with the timing of Plaintiff’s complaints regarding the manager and the termination indicated other SOI employees were treated more favorably.
Please note this Court merely ruled Plaintiffs had a valid cause of action, a verdict has not yet been reported. Plaintiffs’ Complaint also contained Section 1981 claims for failure to promote Plaintiffs and violation of Illinois’ One Day Rest in Seven law. The Court ruled neither of these claims were proper. Regarding the failure to promote claim the Court found neither Plaintiff ever actually applied for any promotion or discussed the possibility with any territory manager. Thus, there was no cause of action. Regarding the One Day Rest in Seven claim the Court found a one-time assignment of an unfavorable weekly work schedule is not an adverse employment action that supports an independent discrimination claim.
Plaintiffs also claimed punitive damages under both Section 1981 and Title VII. The Court stated Section 1981a(a)(1) permits recovery of punitive damages under Title VII only when the complaining party cannot recover under Section 1981, because their Title VII claim (in this case unlawful discharge) and Section 1981 claim (in this case disparate enforcement of company rules) raise separate factual issues. Plaintiffs conceded, typically, a party cannot separately recover punitive damages under both Title VII and Section 1981, but they sought recovery by asserting each of these claims raised separate factual issues.
The Court disagreed finding unlawful discharge and disparate treatment claims arose from the same series of operative facts and stated if Plaintiffs were to prevail at trial they would not be able to recover punitive damages under both Section 1981 and Title VII. We applaud the recognition by this Court that separate claims based on the same facts will not allow a Plaintiff double recovery of punitive damages.
This article was drafted by another recent addition to our team, Matthew Ignoffo, J.D. Please do not hesitate to reply or provide comments to Matt at mignoffo@keefe-law.com.
